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Persistence of Informal Credit in Rural India: Evidence from  
‘All-India Debt and Investment Survey’ and Beyond 
 
Narayan Chandra Pradhan∗
Abstract 
Rural credit markets in India is characterised by the coexistence of both formal and 
informal sources of finance and the market is fragmented. To discuss the informal 
rural credit issue and to maintain consistency with All India Debt and Investment 
Survey (AIDIS) data, this paper treats credit supplied by non-institutional agencies as 
informal while institutional agencies as formal sources of credit. It covers both ‘All-
India Rural Credit Survey 1951-52’ (RBI, 1954) and ‘All-India Rural Debt and 
Investment Survey 1961-62’ (RBI, 1965) conducted by the Reserve Bank and four 
rounds of All-India Debt and Investment Surveys by ‘National Sample Survey 
Organisation’ (NSSO) of the Government of India from 1971-72 to 2002-03. In the 
absence of further survey data, to extend discussion on rural credit scenario 
including ‘Micro Finance Institutions’ (MFIs) beyond 2002, the paper has heavily 
drawn upon four recent official Reports: (i) Report of the Technical Group to Review 
Legislations on Money Lending (RBI, 2006), (ii) Report of the Task Force on Credit 
Related Issues of Farmers (GOI, 2010), (iii) ‘Malegam Committee Report’ (RBI, 
2011), and (iv) Micro Finance Institutions (Development and Regulation) Bill, 2012 
(introduced in Parliament on May 16, 2012). It is assessed that the share of rural 
informal credit in total outstanding debt has been certainly decreasing over the 
period from 1950 to 2002 with various financial inclusion initiatives of the Reserve 
Bank and legislations of the various state governments to regulate moneylenders. 
However, about two-fifth of the rural households’ dependence on informal credit, 
even today, indicates further scope for financial inclusion in rural areas. This augurs 
well for new financial sector initiatives in the form of prompt and innovative policy 
responses to prioritise financial inclusion, financial education as well as financial 
literacy.  
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Key words: rural credit, informal finance, microfinance, non-banking financial 
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I. Introduction 
 Before the First Plan began in 1951, almost all the financial needs of rural 
sector vis-à-vis agriculture were provided by the moneylenders. At that time, the 
Reserve Bank was very active in pursuing cooperative movements through a variety 
of initiatives. Despite all those efforts, the provision of credit through cooperatives 
and commercial banks were to the extent of about 4 per cent of the total outstanding 
debt as at end-June 1951. This finding of Report of the All India Rural Credit survey 
(RBI, 1954), AIRCS henceforth, had laid the foundation stone for furthering the role 
of institutional credit to rural sector through formal channel of cooperatives and 
commercial banks. The AIRCS1 stated, Cooperation has failed, but Cooperation 
must succeed and recommended for credit delivery through institutional channel 
(throughout this paper, formal and institutional as well as informal and non-
institutional are used interchangeably) in the areas of agriculture marketing, 
processing, storage and warehousing. The subsequent formation of ‘Agricultural 
Refinance Corporation’ in 1963, nationalisation of major commercial banks in 1969 
and 1980 in second phase, setting up of Regional Rural Banks in 1975, and 
formation of National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) in 
1982 - all these efforts by the Reserve Bank were to institutionalise the credit 
channel for rural sector. In the 1990s and 2000s, the concept of micro-credit along 
with MFI- and SHG-Bank linkage models have evolved with the institutional support 
of the Reserve Bank and NABARD in order to help the poor in providing credit 
without collaterals (for a succinct description of rural credit scenario in recent years, 
one may refer to: Mohan, 2004; Reddy, 2006; Golait, 2007). 
In recent years, the excessive reliance of borrowers on some or other forms of 
moneylender and informal/semi-formal sources and exorbitant interest rate charged 
by those entities have captured the attention of policy makers to downsize the 
informal sector finance. The Technical Group Report to review legislations on money 
lending (RBI, 2006) by the Reserve Bank had examined, inter alia, the functioning of 
moneylenders, linkages between money lending activities and formal credit 
channels, international practices in regulating money lending activities, and 
enforcement machinery for money lending and similar activities in the interest of rural 
households. The Report of the ‘Task Force on Credit Related Issues of Farmers’ 
(GOI, 2010) submitted to the Ministry of Agriculture in June 2010 had looked into the 
issue of a large number of farmers, who had taken loans from private moneylenders 
(and not covered under the loan waiver scheme). The report has mentioned: In 
recent years, policy interventions have led to doubling of agricultural credit, but the 
limited access of small and marginal farmers to institutional credit continues to be a 
 
1 AIRCS had also recommended for amalgamation of Imperial Banks into the ‘State bank of India’ as 
a special institution for rural credit delivery. 
matter of concern. What is worrying is that the proportion of such farmers is 
increasing and they form more than four-fifths of the operational holdings”.   
The inadequate and untimely credit along with procedural hassles from formal 
institutions has been added to the problem of credit access by rural farmers. At the 
same time, micro finance institutions (MFIs) have been criticised for seeking higher 
interest rate and mostly confined to the states with fairly well-developed banking 
system and also competing for same target group. The performance of some of the 
public sector banks in rural and agricultural lending is also inadequate while that of 
the private and foreign banks is even lower, despite considerable expansion of the 
scope of priority sector lending (Reddy, 2006). These facts have motivated to a large 
extent to the enquiry about the persistence of informal sector finance in rural sector. 
To this end, we have covered the period from 1951 to 2002 on the basis of AIDIS 
Survey data and up to 2011 on the basis of three related reports (RBI, 2006; GOI, 
20102; RBI, 20113). Our discussion on informal credit after 2002 relied on these 
Reports to draw certain linkages as well as policy implications. The Micro Finance 
Institutions (Development and Regulation) Bill, 2012 aims at providing a framework 
for the development and regulation of micro-finance institutions. The Bill has 
entrusted the Reserve Bank with the power to issue directions to all MFIs. 
 For purpose of our analysis of the ‘informal credit in rural India’, we capture 
the financial flows that occur beyond the scope of India’s formal financial system of 
banks and non-banking financial institutions. The Report of the Task Force (GOI, 
2010) was of the view that ‘institutional finance’ should include the following: (a) 
banks and other widely held financial institutions, whether they are public or private 
institutions; (b) state owned financial institutions aimed at financing the less 
privileged; and (c) user owned institutions such as SHGs and their federations and 
cooperatives – both Primary Agricultural Credit Societies (PACS), as well as new 
generation thrift and credit cooperatives registered under more liberal cooperative 
laws. Added to the above sources of finance are also not-for profit Non-Banking 
Financial Companies (NBFCs) and not-for-profit Non-Government Organisations 
(NGOs).  
Although, formal and informal sector credit do not have similar lending 
methodologies (in terms of size, tenure, repayment schedule, collateral 
requirements, etc.), this study focuses on the trends of formal versus informal credit 
in rural India to examine the issues of ‘access to’ and ‘demand for’ credit, ceteris 
paribus. For this purpose, we capture the changing share of institutional and non-
                                                            
2 The Report of the Task Force (Chairman: Shri U. C. Sarangi) submitted to the Government of India 
has analysed the rural credit scenario based on visits to 45 villages across 17 major States during 
2009-10, review of available literature, laws relating to moneylenders - maintaining continuity with 
data on AIDIS Survey. 
3 The ‘Malegam Committee Report’ had studied issues and concerns in the microfinance sector in so 
far as they related to the entities regulated by the Reserve Bank. 
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institutional credit agencies in the outstanding cash dues of the rural households and 
treat credit supplied by non-institutional agencies as informal, whereas, institutional 
agencies as formal sources of credit.  
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section II, we have 
discussed the background of the ‘All India Debt and Investment Survey’, both by the 
Reserve Bank and National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) of the Government 
of India. The discussion on persistence of informal finance in rural areas, both All-
India and State-wise along with credit agency-wise on the basis of data from various 
AIDIS Survey rounds is provided in Section III. Section IV has discussed the informal 
credit aspects in rural areas from three recent Reports as mentioned above. Section 
V concludes with major observations.    
 
II. All India Debt and Investment Survey 
(a) Surveys by the Reserve Bank 
In order to study both the demand and supply sides of credit in the household 
sector, the Reserve Bank had conducted the ‘All-India Rural Credit Survey’ in 1951-
52 and a result of the Survey was published in 1954. Information on assets, 
economic activities, particulars of credit operations and the incidence of 
indebtedness in the rural areas were collected to assess the demand for rural credit. 
Further, data on the extent and mode of operations of different credit agencies were 
also collected with a view to examine the supply side of the credit. The first Rural 
Credit Survey was followed up with a similar Survey in 1961-62 by the Reserve 
Bank. The scope of the survey was extended to include capital expenditure in the 
household sector and other associated indicators of the rural economy. The second 
survey was accordingly titled ‘All India Rural Debt and Investment Survey’ and 
results were published in 1965. Both the surveys by the Reserve Bank were 
conducted for rural areas only.  
(b) Surveys by the NSSO 
The National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) has been conducting All-
India Survey on Debt and Investment, decennially, since its 26th round (1971-72) in 
both rural and urban areas. These surveys generate basic information on assets, 
liabilities and capital expenditure in the household sector of the economy. The All-
India Debt and Investment Survey (AIDIS), which was carried out as part of the 59th 
round of the National Sample Survey (NSS) during January to December 2003 
(latest in the series), was the sixth such survey conducted at the all-India level. 
These reports by NSSO gives the estimates of indebted households and the amount 
of debt classified by various aspects at the State and all-India level in both rural and 
urban areas. At present, the decennially conducted AIDIS is the only nation-wide 
enquiry providing data on household assets, indebtedness and capital expenditure. 
The main objective of the AIDIS is to generate reliable estimates on assets, liabilities 
and capital expenditure of the household sector. The survey provides the details of 
household liabilities required for the formulation of credit policy of financial 
institutions and planning for development.  
According to the AIDIS, the agency from which a loan was taken treated as 
the credit agency. The credit agencies were either ‘institutional agencies’ or ‘non-
institutional agencies’. The various agencies which were treated as ‘institutional 
agencies’ were: government, co-operative agencies, commercial banks including 
regional rural banks, insurance, provident fund, financial Corporation/institution, 
financial company and ‘other institutional agencies’. The agencies which were 
treated as ‘non-institutional agencies’ were: landlord, agriculturist money lender, 
professional money lender, trader, relatives and friends, doctors, lawyers and other 
professionals, and ‘others’. Of all the characteristics in AIDIS, credit agencies and 
terms and rate of interest of loans have been probed into more deeply than the rest, 
in view of their historical importance regarding the supply side and cost of loans, 
respectively.  
 
III. Persistence of Informal Credit in Rural Sector – AIDIS Surveys   
(a) All India Rural Credit Survey (1951-52) 
Although, India inherited a basic network of credit cooperatives from the 
colonial era, the Reserve Bank’s first decennial AIRCS 1951-52 (RBI, 1954) found 
that 92.8 per cent of rural households relied on informal financial sector (Table 1). 
The investigation extended over nearly 1,30,000 families having residents in 600 
villages and all types of credit agencies in 75 selected districts. During 1951-52, an 
increase in debt was recorded in all the 75 districts (in 20 districts the increase in 
debt was below 50 per cent; in 31 districts the increase varied from 50 to 100 per 
cent; in 19 districts from 100 to 200 per cent; and in 5 districts the increase exceeded 
200 per cent). 
The moneylenders’ continued dominance in the beginning of Plan period 
(around 70 per cent of rural credit) despite all measures to control them, suppress or 
supplant had led to the suggestion that ‘… any realistic system of rural credit should 
seek to incorporate him in itself rather than compete with him or wishfully expect to 
eliminate him’(RBI, 1954). Among creditors, the moneylender, and among 
moneylenders the professional moneylender dominates the rural credit scenario. The 
dominance itself has been made possible by the ineffectiveness of all attempts to 
organise a competitive agency for supply of rural credit. The first AIRCS had opined 
that the co-operatives were ‘utter failure’ in providing rural credit, but added they had 
a vital role in agricultural credit. Loans from relatives (virtually interest free) 
accounted for 14 per cent of the reported borrowings of cultivators. About 6 per cent 
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of the total borrowings of cultivators were from traders and commission agents. The 
combined contribution of Government and Cooperatives was about 6 per cent of the 
total rural credit, each accounting for about 3 per cent. As for commercial banks, 1 
per cent represented the insignificant part played by them in the direct financing of 
the cultivator. In 44 out of the 75 districts selected for the Survey, not a single pie 
was reported as having been borrowed by cultivators from a commercial bank. 
Table 1: Break-up of Institutional and Non-Institutional Rural Credit 
(Per cent)
 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2002
Institutional Agencies 7.2 14.8 29.2 61.2 64.0 57.1
Government 3.3 5.3 6.7 4.0 5.7 2.3
Co-op. Society/bank 3.1 9.1 20.1 28.6 18.6 27.3
Commercial bank incl. RRBs 0.8 0.4 2.2 28.0 29.0 24.5
Insurance -- -- 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.3
Provident Fund -- -- 0.1 0.3 0.9 0.3
Others institutional agencies*  -- -- -- -- 9.3 2.4
Non-Institutional Agencies 92.8 85.2 70.8 38.8 36.0 42.9
Landlord 1.5 0.9 8.6 4.0 4.0 1.0
Agricultural Moneylender 24.9 45.9 23.1 8.6 6.3 10.0
Professional Moneylender 44.8 14.9 13.8 8.3 9.4 19.6
Traders and Commission Agents  5.5 7.7 8.7 3.4 7.1 2.6
Relatives and Friends 14.2 6.8 13.8 9.0 6.7 7.1
Others 1.9 8.9 2.8 4.9 2.5 2.6
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
*: includes financial corporation/institution, financial company and other institutional 
agencies. 
Note: Percentage share of different credit agencies to the outstanding cash dues of 
the households as on 30th June.  
-- denotes not available.  
Source: All India Rural Credit Survey (1954); All India Debt and Investment Survey, 
Various Issues.  
 
AIRCS (RBI, 1954) pointed out that “agricultural prices during the Survey year 
witnessed a stagnation followed by a steep decline for the first time in a period over 
ten years”. However, a large part of the working funds borrowed by subsistence 
farmers seems to be related to consumption rather than production. The problem 
turned into more complicated one due to the socio-economic structure of the village 
with its characteristics of caste and inequality. Other factors that might have aided to 
the trend towards an increase in debt were relatively large incidence of drought, 
famine and inclement seasonal credit.  
As our description built upon statistical data analysis and survey of literature, 
the brief about significance of informal credit agencies in supplying credit to rural 
areas during 1950s can be summarised as follows: Moneylenders were dominant not 
only due to their effective adaptation to rural areas, but also the ineffectiveness of 
any other competitive agency. Traders and Commission Agents were in direct 
contact with the cultivators and much of this financing was really in the nature of 
advance payment for purchase of products. The indigenous bankers were financier 
of trade and also traders themselves as well as finances moneylenders. Commercial 
banks were more interested in rural areas more for the purpose of getting deposits 
rather than financing either agriculture or cottage industry.      
(b) All India Rural Debt and Investment Survey 1961-62 
In this second Survey by Reserve Bank, the outstanding loans owed to 
agriculturist moneylenders accounted for about 46 per cent of the aggregate 
outstanding of all rural households, nearly double the share compared to first 
Survey. The share of outstanding loans owing to professional moneylenders was 
next highest though their share declined constituting 15 per cent of the aggregate 
outstanding. As per the Survey findings on all-India basis (Table 1), the share of 
cooperatives was at 9.1 per cent, ‘others’ at 8.9 per cent, traders and commission 
agents at 7.7 per cent, relatives at 6.8 per cent and government at 5.3 per cent in the 
total outstanding debt. The shares of landlords and commercial banks in the 
aggregate outstanding were negligible at 0.9 per cent and 0.4 per cent, respectively. 
This fact signifies the continuance of informal finance in rural India that might have 
prompted the nationalization of commercial banks in 1969 in the first phase.  
The State-wise position in respect of outstanding loan owed to different credit 
agencies is provided in Appendix Table 1. It can be ascertained that the outstanding 
loans owed to agricultural moneylenders constitute 74 per cent of the aggregate 
outstanding of the rural households in Bihar, about 64 per cent each in Andhra 
Pradesh and Madras and about 60 per cent in Mysore. Their share was very low in 
Jammu & Kashmir (7 per cent) reflects low dependence on agriculture and Gujarat 
(9.8 per cent) due to higher share of cooperatives (20.3 per cent). On the other hand, 
the share of cooperatives was below 5 per cent in Bihar (0.9 per cent), Rajasthan 
(2.0 per cent), and West Bengal (4.1 per cent). For other states, it varied between 7 
– 14 per cent. The share of professional moneylenders in the aggregate outstanding 
was the highest in Orissa (37.3 per cent) followed by Rajasthan (35.3 per cent), 
Madhya Pradesh (31.0 per cent), and Uttar Pradesh (24.5 per cent). It was very low 
in Mysore (1.4 per cent), Jammu & Kashmir (5.4 per cent), and Kerala (5.6 per cent) 
and varied between 6-15 per cent in other states. The share of Government in the 
aggregate outstanding was about 19 per cent in West Bengal and Maharashtra, 15 
per cent in Assam and 12 per cent in Orissa. In all other States, it was 5 per cent or 
less.    
The first three categories of informal lenders – landlords, agricultural 
moneylenders, and professional moneylenders – are not necessarily distinct from 
one another depending on the locality. But generally speaking, landlord money-
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lenders extend credit to tenants; agricultural moneylenders primarily deal with 
agricultural labourers and small farmers; and professional moneylenders service a 
wider range of customers and may register themselves as companies, partnerships, 
and trusts (Ghate, 1992). Those in the fourth official category, ‘traders and 
commission agents’ are also known as indigenous bankers. In contrast to 
professional moneylenders who lend their own money, indigenous bankers broker 
funds between banks and their clients, who tend to be traders rather than farmers. 
One of the important reasons for continued dependence on moneylenders is that the 
formal credit delivery structure has not stretched to the villages despite its 
penetration (Ghate 1988). The formal credit delivery channels also lack the personal 
bonds that moneylenders enjoy with the borrowers. Borrowers obtain their loans 
more promptly from non-institutional sources.  
(c) All India Rural Debt and Investment Survey 1971-72 to 2001-02 
At the outset, it may be mentioned that the Survey results of 26th round (1971-
72), 37th round (1981-82), 48th round (1991-92) and 59th round (2002-03) of AIDIS 
are comparable across the Agency-wise and State-wise over the period. In order to 
compare the progress of formal and informal finance after the bank nationalization 
and to provide an overview of the flow of credit to rural areas in terms of credit 
agency-wise, we have analyzed these Survey results in a comparative manner and 
State-wise separately. It is important to note that there are problems in using data 
from these surveys given the sharp reduction in sample size of households and 
villages, especially in the 37th round in 1981-82. It may further be mentioned that, the 
estimates of household debt starting from 48th round in 1991-92 are based on both 
cash and kind, whereas before that it was based on cash debt.            
From Table 1, it can be assessed that the informal/non-institutional finance 
was gradually declining during the 1960s, was very nearly broken during the 1970s, 
with the institutional agencies making steady inroads into the rural scene. The share 
of institutional credit agencies in the outstanding cash dues of the rural households 
at the all-India level increased from 29 per cent in 1971 to 61 per cent in 1981 and 
then the pace of increase was arrested rising to 64 per cent in 1991. During the 
following decade, the share declined by about 7 percentage points and reached 57 
per cent in 2002. It seems that credit cooperatives, commercial banks, and other 
formal financial sector programs in rural areas have not displaced informal sources 
of credit, altogether. The 2002 AIDIS survey revealed that 43 per cent of rural 
households continue to rely on informal finance, which includes professional 
moneylenders, agricultural moneylenders, traders, relatives and friends, and others.  
Institutional agencies (All-India Level) 
From Table 1, it can be observed that, the most remarkable performance was 
that of the commercial banks while the share of co-operative societies in the 
outstanding cash dues of cultivator households increased from 20.1 per cent in 1971 
to 28.6 per cent in 1981, therefore dropping to 27.3 per cent in 2002, that of 
commercial banks rose to 29 per cent in 1991, after rising sharply to 28 per cent in 
1981 from a meager 2 per cent in 1971. It appears that the large number of branches 
that was set up by various commercial banks in 1970s and the subsequent 
introduction of rural banking schemes have driven the commercial banks to assume 
the role of principal credit agency in rural areas. It may be of interest to note that the 
share of government departments in the outstanding cash dues of cultivator 
households, after showing a decline from 7 per cent in 1971 to 4 per cent in 1981, 
again rose to 6 per cent in 1991 and dropped to 2 per cent in 2002. As a whole, at 
the all India level, among the institutional credit agencies, the co-operative societies 
and the commercial banks were the two most important agencies in the rural sector. 
These two agencies together, shared 91 per cent of the entire amount of debt 
advanced by the institutional agencies, accounted for 52 per cent of the outstanding 
cash debt, with co-operative societies (27.3 per cent) accounting for a greater share 
than the Banks (24.5 per cent) in 2002. 
The gradual increase in the share of formal institutional credit in agriculture 
witnessed some reversal during 1991-2002 mainly because of a pull back by 
commercial banks. This disquieting trend is, in part, due to a contraction in rural 
branch network in the 1990s, and in part due to the general rigidities in procedures 
and systems of institutional sources of credit (Subbarao, 2012).  
Non- Institutional agencies (All-India Level) 
The combined share of all the non-institutional credit agencies in the 
outstanding cash dues of cultivator households recorded a sharp decline of 32 
percentage points during 1970s but the decline got arrested in the 1980s – the fall 
being just of about 3 percentage points but increased to 43 per cent subsequently. 
The decline is found to be the steepest for the credit agency ‘agricultural money 
lenders’, whose share came down to 6 per cent in 1991 from about 9 per cent in 
1981 and 23 per cent in 1971. However, the share of ‘professional money lenders’ 
has reported a rise to about 9 per cent in 1991, after registering a fall to 8 per cent in 
1981 from about 14 per cent in 1971. Subsequently, the share has jumped to about 
20 per cent in 2002. Relatives and friends appear to be gradually losing their 
importance as a source of credit. From 14 per cent in 1971, their share fell to 9 per 
cent in 1981, and dipped further down to about 7 per cent subsequently. As a whole, 
among the non-institutional agencies, professional money lenders were the main 
source of credit. Among the non-institutional credit agencies, money lenders – both 
professional and agricultural – in that order were found to be important sources of 
finance in rural areas, their respective shares being 19.6 per cent and 10.0 per cent. 
The share of relatives and friends was 7 per cent of the cash dues of rural 
households. 
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State-level Changes during 1971 to 2002 
The State-level estimate indicates that of the total outstanding cash dues, the 
share of institutional agencies had increased marginally during the 1980s in most of 
the states, after having increased substantially during the 1970s (Table 2). However, 
the role of the institutional agencies, as judged from their share in the outstanding 
cash dues, varied from state to state. A snapshot of this variation in 2002 shows that 
in the rural areas, institutional credit agencies accounted for 85 per cent in 
Maharashtra, followed by Kerala (81 per cent), Himachal Pradesh and Orissa (74 per 
cent each) and Jammu & Kashmir (73 per cent). In contrast, not even 50 per cent of 
the debt was contracted through the institutional credit agencies in the rural areas of 
Andhra Pradesh (27 per cent), Rajasthan (34 per cent), Bihar (37 per cent) and 
Tamil Nadu (47 per cent).  
Table 2: Share of Institutional and Non-Institutional Agencies in 
Outstanding Cash Debt of Major States in Rural Areas 
(Per cent)
Institutional Non-Institutional  
Major States 1971 
(26th) 
1981 
(37th) 
1991 
(48th) 
2002 
(59th) 
1971 
(26th) 
1981 
(37th) 
1991 
(48th) 
2002 
(59th) 
Andhra Pradesh 14 41 34 27 86 59 66 73 
Assam 35 31 66 58 65 69 34 42 
Bihar 11 47 73 37 89 53 27 63 
Gujarat 47 70 75 67 53 30 25 33 
Haryana 26 76 73 50 74 24 27 50 
Himachal Pradesh 24 75 62 74 76 25 38 26 
Jammu  & Kashmir 20 44 76 73 80 56 24 27 
Karnataka 30 78 78 67 70 22 22 33 
Kerala 44 79 92 81 56 21 8 19 
Madhya Pradesh 32 66 73 59 68 34 27 41 
Maharashtra 67 86 82 85 33 14 18 15 
Orissa 30 81 80 74 70 19 20 26 
Punjab 36 74 79 56 64 26 21 44 
Rajasthan 9 41 40 34 91 59 60 66 
Tamil Nadu 22 44 58 47 78 56 42 53 
Uttar Pradesh 23 55 69 56 77 45 31 44 
West Bengal 31 66 82 68 69 34 18 32 
All India 29 61 64 57 71 39 36 43 
Source: All India Debt and Investment Survey, NSS 59th Round, Report No. 501. 
During the periods 1971 to 2002, the states do not reveal any uniform pattern 
in the share of institutional agencies in total debt. Compared to 1991, the picture had 
changed in some of the major states (Table 2). Of the 20 major states in the rural, as 
many as 15 have shown a fall in the share of institutional agencies, notable among 
them are Bihar, Punjab, Haryana and West Bengal, where the fall in percentage 
share from 1991 values had been to the tune of 36, 23, 23 and 14 percentage points, 
respectively. On the other hand, 13 major states out of 21 had registered a rise in the 
share, which, barring a few with marginal to moderate rise, can be described as 
sharp to spectacular (The detailed State-wise and Agency-wise position is provided 
in Appendix Tables 2-5). 
 
IV. Recent Reports on ‘Informal Credit Related Issues’  
 In the absence of survey data beyond AIDIS 2002 (published in December 
2005), we have heavily drawn upon three recent Reports (RBI, 2006; GOI, 2010; 
RBI, 2011) that were also based on the sample surveys and extended the AIDIS 
data. The Report of the Task Force on ‘Credit Related Issues of Farmers’ (Chairman: 
Shri U. C. Sarangi), submitted to the Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India, 
looked into the issue of a large number of farmers who had taken loans from private 
moneylenders, but not covered under the ‘Agricultural Debt Waiver and Debt Relief 
Scheme’ of 2008. The Task Force Report has observed that “…more disquieting 
feature of the trend was the increase in the share of moneylenders in the total debt 
of cultivators. There was an inverse relationship between land-size and the share of 
debt from informal sources. Moreover, a considerable proportion of the debt from 
informal sources was incurred at a fairly high rate of interest”. About 36 per cent of 
the debt of farmers from informal sources had interest ranging from 20 to 25 per 
cent. Another 38 per cent of loans had been borrowed at an even higher rate of 30 
per cent and above, indicating the excessive interest burden of such debt on small 
and marginal farmers. The continued dependence of small and marginal farmers on 
informal sources of credit such as private moneylenders was attributed to constraint 
in the rural banking network and services arising out of financial sector reforms. 
Rigid procedures and systems of formal sources preventing easy access by small 
and marginal farmers, vied with the easy and more flexible methods of lending 
adopted by informal sources. The Task Force members came across situations 
where farmers were borrowing at the rate of five to ten per cent per month.  
The identification of farmers indebted to private moneylenders is difficult. 
Such loans in most cases have no formal records and identifying and authenticating 
the debt from moneylenders may lead to problems of moral hazard (GOI, 2010). 
According to the Report, credit needs of small and marginal farmers are not only 
growing but are getting diversified due to increasing commercialization and 
modernization of agriculture. Simultaneously, for a variety of other needs, farmers 
incur considerable expenditure, resulting in increased borrowings. Adequacy, 
timeliness, affordability and convenience are factors that influence farmers, and for 
that matter, all borrowers, in their choice of creditors. Given that a single source may 
not to be able to satisfy all their credit needs, many farmers approach both formal 
and informal sources. Invariably, those who cannot afford any collateral are forced to 
borrow from informal sources. The Task Force reviewed the debt swap schemes of 
banks and revealed that these schemes had limited success as farmers were 
reluctant to disclose the name of the money-lenders, apprehensive in disclosing debt 
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and some had even repaid the existing debt out of their Kisan Credit Card limits. 
Even though the Task Force came across some good debt swap schemes, bankers 
reported difficulty in taking these to scale and also reported that there was little 
guarantee that farmers would not ever again borrow from moneylenders.  
Based on a review of the existing laws on money lending in the country, the 
‘Technical Group to Review Legislation on Money Lending’ (RBI, 2006) has 
observed: “…in spite of there being a legislation, a large number of moneylenders 
continue to operate without license, and even the registered moneylenders charge 
interest rates much higher than permitted by the legislation, apart from not complying 
with other provisions of the legislation. Signs of effective enforcement are absent”. 
The Report recommended legislative reforms to streamline the activities of 
moneylenders through suitable mechanism of incentives and disincentives. In this 
regard, Jeromi (2007) attempted to analyse the working of moneylenders in Kerala 
based on a sample survey, and mentioned that the existing legal provisions and 
regulatory and supervisory mechanisms are inadequate to protect the interests of 
both depositors and creditors in rural Kerala. 
The growing commercialisation of Indian agriculture has encouraged the rise 
of trader-moneylender, as the formal sector finance is inadequate to meet the 
growing credit requirements of agriculture. The Task Force (GOI, 2010) noted that 
the moneylender today comes in many forms – as an outright lender, as a supplier of 
inputs/consumer goods, as a for-profit non-banking finance companies (NBFCs) 
including the for-profit MFIs, as a buyer of produce, and as an owner of the land on 
which the farmer is dependent. The sheer numbers of moneylenders, easy access to 
them, and their intricate relationships with the borrowers coupled with limited access 
to formal institutions made it difficult for borrowers to complain against them. 
Micro Finance Scenario 
 Microfinance sector in India has progressed remarkably since 1990s and this 
sector has been acting as an important ally in expanding financial inclusion in rural 
areas (NABARD, 2012). Reserve Bank provides guidelines to banks for 
mainstreaming micro-credit providers, inter alia, stipulated that micro-credit extended 
by banks to individual borrowers directly or through any intermediary would be 
reckoned as part of their priority sector lending. However, no particular model was 
prescribed for micro-finance and banks have been extended freedom to formulate 
their own models or choose any conduit/intermediary for extending micro-credit. 
Though, there are different models for microfinance provision, the self-help-group 
(SHG)-Bank Linkage Programme has emerged as the major microfinance program 
in the country. It is being implemented by commercial banks, regional rural banks 
(RRBs) and cooperative banks. The gathering momentum in the microfinance sector 
has brought into focus the issue of regulating the sector.  
The Malegam Committee Report (RBI, 2011) was constituted to study issues 
and concerns in the MFI sector in the wake of Andhra Pradesh micro finance crisis in 
2010. The Committee, inter alia, recommended (i) creation of a separate category of 
NBFC-MFIs; (ii) a margin cap and an interest rate cap on individual loans; (iii) 
transparency in interest charges; (iv) lending by not more than two MFIs to individual 
borrowers; (v) creation of one or more credit information bureaus; (vi) establishment 
of a proper system of grievance redressal procedure by MFIs; (vii) creation of one or 
more “social capital funds”; and (viii) continuation of categorisation of bank loans to 
MFIs, complying with the regulation laid down for NBFC-MFIs, under the priority 
sector. The recommendations of the Committee were discussed with all 
stakeholders, including the Government of India, select State Governments, major 
NBFCs working as MFIs, industry associations of MFIs working in the country, other 
smaller MFIs, and major banks. The Reserve Bank has accepted the broad 
framework of regulations recommended by the Committee Report. 
The The Micro Finance Institutions (Development and Regulation) Bill, 2012 
envisages that the Reserve Bank would be the overall regulator of the MFI sector, 
regardless of legal structure. The Reserve Bank has provided the views on the Bill to 
the Government of India. The aims of the Bill are to regulate the sector in the 
customers’ interest and to avoid a multitude of microfinance legislation in different 
states. The proper balancing of the resources at the Reserve Bank to supervise 
these additional sets of institutions besides the existing regulated institutions could 
be an important issue. Requiring all MFIs to register is a critical and necessary step 
towards effective regulation. The proposal for appointment of an Ombudsman will 
boost the banking industry’s own efforts to handle grievances better. Compulsory 
registration of the MFIs would bring the erstwhile money-lenders into the fold of 
organised financial services in the hinterland who had been acting as MFIs hitherto.    
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V. Concluding Observations 
The key findings from the above analysis is that informal credit has certainly 
declined as a percentage of total debt, and both professional and agricultural 
moneylenders have reduced their share over time. Informal/non-institutional finance 
was gradually declining during the 1960s and was nearly broken during the 1970s 
with the institutional agencies venturing into the rural areas with nationalization of 
major commercial banks and setting up of regional rural banks with initiatives of the 
Reserve Bank. The decline in the share of moneylenders reflects in part the 
Government’s efforts to register and regulate professional moneylenders. 
At the all India level, among the institutional credit agencies, the co-operative 
societies and the commercial banks were the two most important agencies in the 
rural sector. These two agencies together shared 91 per cent of the entire amount of 
debt advanced by the institutional agencies, accounted for 52 per cent of the 
outstanding cash debt, with co-operative societies (27.3 per cent) accounting for a 
greater share than the Banks (24.5 per cent). Of the 20 major states in 2002, as 
many as 15 have shown a fall in the share of institutional agencies, notable among 
them are Bihar, Punjab, Haryana and West Bengal. The above facts indicate that the 
cooperatives, commercial banks, and other formal financial sector programs in rural 
areas have not displaced informal sources of credit altogether as 43 per cent of rural 
households continue to rely on informal finance in 2002. 
The most important reason for continuation of informal rural credit market is 
that the existing financial institutions tend to restrict their lending activities to more 
risky field of lending to the agricultural sector. Those in the rural credit market prefer 
to use informal sources of credit despite the fact that the interest rates are much 
higher. Informal sources do not insist on punctual repayment as banks or 
cooperative societies do. Usually, it is possible to obtain loans for such purposes as 
marriage and litigation only from informal sources. There are generally no intricate 
and complicated rules governing the granting of loans by the village moneylenders. 
And informal sources are willing to lend money more freely without collateral and on 
the borrower's mere promise to repay.   
As reported in Malegam Committee Report, the impact of microfinance on the 
lives of the poor is inconclusive. The micro surveys create fears that in some cases 
microfinance has created credit dependency and cyclical debt. The analysts 
expressed doubt as to whether lending agencies have in all cases remained 
committed to the goal of fighting poverty or whether they are solely motivated by 
financial gain. This augurs well for the regulation of microfinance as a tool of financial 
inclusion and greater well being of the society. 
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 Appendix Table 1: Outstanding Cash Debt of Major States as on June 30, 1962 
– Credit Agency Wise (AIDIS 1961-62) 
(Per cent)
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1. Andhra Pradesh 1.6 7.3 0.6 0.3 64.0 9.9 10.7 2.0 3.6
2. Assam 15.5 8.3 -- 0.3 35.5 14.6 6.4 11.9 7.6
3. Bihar 4.2 0.9 -- 0.1 74.0 12.1 2.8 3.5 2.3
4. Gujarat 3.3 20.3 0.1 0.1 9.8 8.1 16.0 19.2 23.2
5. Jammu & Kashmir 0.3 9.2 0.2 2.1 7.0 5.4 23.1 19.5 33.2
6. Kerala 4.5 9.1 4.0 3.1 16.2 5.6 5.2 14.7 37.8
7. Madhya Pradesh 4.2 11.4 0.1 0.3 37.7 31.0 9.7 3.0 2.7
8. Madras 2.8 9.3 1.4 0.2 63.7 6.7 6.1 3.0 6.7
9. Maharashtra 18.8 27.5 0.1 0.8 17.6 8.7 3.5 12.4 10.6
10. Mysore 4.1 11.4 0.6 1.1 59.8 1.4 7.0 5.8 8.8
11. Orissa 12.0 14.4 -- 1.0 22.4 37.3 3.8 2.8 6.5
12. Punjab  3.6 7.1 -- 6.7 48.6 12.8 2.9 10.5 7.8
13. Rajasthan 2.5 2.0 -- 0.2 29.2 35.3 15.0 4.7 11.1
14. Uttar Pradesh 3.0 7.8 0.2 0.1 42.5 24.5 5.2 8.0 8.8
15. West Bengal 19.2 4.1 0.1 1.0 31.8 7.4 7.0 12.6 16.9
All India 5.3 9.1 0.4 0.9 45.9 14.9 7.7 6.8 8.9
Source: All India Debt and Investment Survey, 1961-62 (RBI, 1965). 
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Appendix Table 2: Outstanding Cash Debt of Major States as on June 30, 
1972 – Credit Agency Wise (AIDIS 1971-72) 
(Per cent)
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1. Andhra Pradesh 2.2 9.4 1.9 46.8 23.3 12.6 3.9
2. Assam 23.5 10.6 0.0 19.7 11.6 27.0 7.6
3. Bihar 5.9 4.4 0.4 55.7 19.1 12.6 1.9
4. Gujarat 6.0 37.8 3.0 11.9 21.0 18.1 2.2
5. Jammu & Kashmir 12.7 7.8 0.0 11.5 34.6 32.4 1.0
6. Karnataka 8.4 15.9 5.3 38.8 20.0 9.6 1.9
7. Kerala 4.7 25.3 13.2 16.1 7.6 23.0 9.8
8. Madhya Pradesh 4.0 26.0 1.1 45.8 15.5 5.7 1.9
9. Maharashtra 11.7 54.3 1.3 9.7 8.9 12.6 1.5
10. Orissa 8.9 20.1 0.7 39.1 11.9 13.0 6.3
11. Punjab & Haryana 5.2 24.0 3.1 27.1 24.4 13.7 2.5
12. Rajasthan 3.9 5.0 0.5 49.6 23.6 12.3 5.1
13. Tamil Nadu 5.7 14.6 1.6 44.5 15.9 14.4 3.3
14. Uttar Pradesh 8.4 13.2 1.3 50.3 11.1 12.8 2.9
15. West Bengal 14.7 13.8 1.2 28.1 14.0 25.2 3.2
All India 6.7 20.1 2.2 36.9 17.3 13.8 3.0
Source: All India Debt and Investment Survey, 1971-72 (RBI, 1977). 
 
 Appendix Table 3: Outstanding Cash Debt of Major States as on June 30, 1982 
– Credit Agency Wise (AIDIS 1981-82) 
(Per cent)
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1. Andhra Pradesh 2.2 20.0 18.3 0.1 0.0 10.9 14.6 9.7 4.8 7.6 10.5
2. Assam 2.0 6.0 16.0 0.0 6.0 -- 2.0 4.0 2.0 34.0 28.0
3. Bihar 9.3 8.3 29.4 0.0 0.0 11.3 18.6 4.9 1.5 11.3 4.4
4. Gujarat 1.9 53.8 14.3 0.0 0.0 2.7 1.1 1.7 6.5 16.4 0.4
5. Haryana 6.2 22.7 46.6 0.3 0.0 2.2 5.2 8.9 0.6 6.3 1.0
6. Himachal Pradesh 6.8 41.6 25.8 0.0 0.0 0.6 4.2 4.2 1.1 13.9 1.4
7. Jammu & Kashmir 4.8 7.6 31.2 0.0 0.0  -- 1.2 0.4 27.6 12.8 3.6
8. Kerala 2.4 26.5 48.8 0.4 0.0 2.2 6.1 3.4 0.9 7.3 1.0
9. Madhya Pradesh 5.8 34.0 37.1 0.4 1.4 0.1 0.1 3.6 1.4 11.8 4.1
10. Maharashtra 2.1 32.7 31.2 0.0 0.0 2.5 6.2 15.7 4.6 4.2 0.8
11. Mysore 3.9 54.8 26.8 0.9 0.1 0.8 1.3 1.3 0.7 7.3 2.0
12. Orissa 7.7 46.7 27.5 0.0 0.0 0.9 1.2 1.2 3.5 2.0 4.6
13. Punjab 7.5 21.4 43.8 1.0 0.4 2.8 4.8 4.8 5.0 5.7 2.4
14. Rajasthan 0.6 16.3 23.6 0.3 0.0 4.9 9.5 9.5 4.9 12.3 10.3
15. Tamil Nadu 2.6 27.8 12.9 0.5 0.6 4.7 15.1 15.1 4.2 9.7 8.7
16. Uttar Pradesh 4.9 21.0 29.0 0.0 0.0 2.5 14.3 14.3 2.8 9.2 3.1
17. West Bengal 7.1 23.6 32.4 0.3 2.4 1.0 4.8 4.8 5.4 14.8 3.0
All India 4.0 28.6 28.0 0.3 0.3 4.0 8.6 8.3 3.4 9.0 4.9
Source: All India Debt and Investment Survey, 1981-82 (RBI, 1987). 
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Appendix Table 4: Outstanding Cash Debt of Major States as on June 30, 1992
– Credit Agency Wise (AIDIS 1991-92) 
(Per cent)
State 
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1. Andhra Pradesh 2.6 12.4 15.4 15.4 36.0 8.6 1.3 8.3
2. Assam 5.6 15.5 9.1 0.0 25.8 35.9 4.8 3.3
3. Bihar 6.9 20.1 36.9 1.8 16.2 3.9 5.4 8.8
4. Gujrat 5.8 41.4 35.6 0.0 0.2 9.1 6.9 1.0
5. Haryana 2.4 23.0 43.5 7.8 12.6 4.1 2.1 4.5
6. Himachal Pradesh 3.9 21.7 32.9 0.4 4.1 30.7 1.6 4.7
7. Jammu & Kashmir 4.9 9.1 43.0 2.0 2.2 3.1 17.0 18.7
8. Karnataka 5.0 22.1 42.7 3.3 10.1 4.0 2.7 10.1
9. Kerala 22.7 45.6 19.1 0.0 2.8 1.6 4.0 4.2
10. Madhya Pradesh 3.6 21.2 44.5 2.1 22.1 2.1 8.0 3.6
11. Maharashtra 5.1 45.4 27.2 0.8 6.7 1.1 9.5 4.2
12. Manipur 9.2 13.1 0.4 0.0 2.3 42.0 31.4 1.6
13. Meghalaya 67.4 23.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.4 0.0
14. Nagaland 21.0 7.3 27.0 0.0 3.3 0.0 40.3 1.1
15. Orissa 7.1 21.5 44.2 0.3 12.6 1.6 3.6 9.1
16. Punjab 2.5 20.1 55.3 2.0 3.7 6.9 7.9 1.6
17. Rajasthan 3.9 6.6 25.4 3.1 37.3 14.2 0.5 9.0
18. Sikkim 25.7 12.2 50.7 0.0 4.2 4.0 1.2 2.0
19. Tamilnadu 3.3 17.5 32.5 4.2 22.1 9.1 6.3 5.0
20. Tripura 26.5 12.8 49.9 0.0 1.9 2.6 6.1 0.2
21. Uttar Pradesh 7.2 14.2 44.8 1.6 15.7 4.3 9.2 3.0
22. West Bengal 11.8 20.1 41.5 0.1 5.9 3.5 8.6 8.5
All India 5.7 18.6 29.0 4.0 15.7 7.1 6.7 2.5
Source: All India Debt and Investment Survey, 1991-92. 
 Appendix Table 5: Outstanding Cash Debt of Major States as on June 30, 2002 
– Credit Agency Wise (AIDIS 2001-02) 
(Per cent)
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Andhra Pradesh 0.7 11.7 13.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.4 3.3 27.7 29.7 5.0 1.5 5.6
Assam 15.4 5.2 23.0 0.1 7.3 2.2 0.8 3.9 0.2 2.4 23.8 1.4 12.4 1.9
Bihar 2.3 6.2 27.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.6 1.1 18.7 27.8 1.4 7.4 7.1
Chattisgarh 2.5 23.9 56.5 0.1 1.1 0.0 0.9 0.2 1.2 1.4 6.6 1.2 3.5 0.7
Gujarat 2.9 40.1 22.4 0.0 0.1 1.2 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.3 8.0 3.9 20.5 0.0
Haryana 0.4 22.7 25.7 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 15.0 26.5 1.4 3.0 2.9
Himachal Pradesh 4.5 25.1 40.3 0.0 0.7 0.2 2.3 0.5 0.2 0.2 3.0 0.5 17.6 4.8
Jammu & Kashmir 0.7 11.0 60.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 26.5 0.0
Jharkhand 10.5 9.5 46.9 0.0 3.3 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.7 3.5 13.6 0.7 10.7 0.2
Karnataka 1.2 35.3 28.9 0.1 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.3 1.8 9.5 14.0 2.0 5.0 1.0
Kerala 4.8 46.2 23.0 0.5 0.1 5.2 0.2 1.3 0.0 0.1 7.8 0.1 9.1 1.6
Madhya Pradesh 0.9 33.6 23.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 9.8 21.1 3.3 1.8 5.1
Maharashtra 1.0 60.3 20.9 0.8 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.1 2.4 4.0 0.3 6.6 1.8
Orissa 1.4 29.3 31.8 0.0 1.6 9.5 0.0 0.4 0.1 4.4 18.2 0.1 2.4 0.7
Punjab 1.1 19.0 28.6 0.1 0.0 1.2 6.3 0.2 2.6 16.5 7.8 1.5 13.9 1.4
Rajasthan 0.6 11.8 21.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.5 16.8 32.1 10.6 4.5 1.7
Tamil Nadu 2.8 23.8 17.2 0.9 0.6 0.1 0.4 0.9 0.6 4.2 42.2 0.6 4.3 1.4
Uttaranchal 1.4 12.2 44.9 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 12.8 0.1 25.3 1.3
Uttar Pradesh 2.5 11.7 38.6 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 2.8 0.5 9.3 20.2 1.5 9.9 2.7
West Bengal 11.9 14.0 35.6 0.2 2.0 2.7 0.3 0.8 0.4 2.1 10.8 2.9 14.2 2.1
All India 2.3 27.3 24.5 0.3 0.3 1.1 0.6 0.7 1.0 10.0 19.6 2.6 7.1 2.6
Source: All India Debt and Investment Survey, 2001-02. 
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